Friday, 1 February 2013

How Much Tolerance Can We Tolerate?

Good People and Going Wrong, Part 5

My brother once had a coworker with whom he frequently disagreed. My brother was perfectly OK with gay marriage and women who were preachers. His coworker was not especially OK with these things. If the Bible says that women can only preach if there are no men to do it, then he says he does not intend for it to come to that.

One day the coworker came to work with the root of their difference figured out. "You are tolerant," he said. "I am intolerant."

My brother was fairly accepting of this assessment because he thought he was getting the better end of that deal. However, he told me, his coworker did not agree. To his coworker, it would be better to be intolerant than tolerant. And this struck us as being alien, though kind of understandable: what the coworker thought my brother was tolerating was very bad, and of course you should not tolerate something terrible.

It is a commonplace now to say that part of the problem preceding the Second World War was that the world tolerated Hitler's actions. If the world were not so tolerant of Nazism, perhaps fewer atrocities would have occurred. I think most of us on the political left would agree that certain things must not be tolerated. Indeed, the left generally tries not to tolerate racism, sexism, etc.* So when the left talks about tolerance and mutual respect, clearly what we want to tolerate is a different kind of difference than certain ethical differences. Right?

I’m going to be rather writerly right now. I don't know what to write next. This seems like a meta-ethical problem: tolerance is clearly a value in the sense I've been using the word as much as it is part of a philosophical ethical system. But on the other hand this value is about how we conduct ourselves towards other people's values. It is a meta-value, and for all that it seems to be one of the most deeply rooted values that my segment of the culture holds. On the other hand, it seems to be only certain kinds of difference that are tolerated: difference in sexual behaviour, difference in language, difference in degree of socialism/communism. Social and fiscal conservatism are not especially tolerable, at least not among some.

To continue being writerly, indicated by my italics, it is exactly this problem that this series is supposed to be about. I want to agree with my brother, that tolerance is a good thing and intolerance is a bad thing. I also want to say that good people sometimes do what I would consider bad things specifically because they are well-intentioned (but incorrect about what is the "right" thing to do). But I want to say that even so there are people who maybe aren't "bad people," but who certainly aren't really good people, either. So I want to say that tolerance is a value, but that I am intolerant of some things. I know there is an act of equivocation here, and I think it’s that what is meant by “tolerance” in the leftist sense is not actual tolerance after all. Tolerance suggests that something about the tolerated behaviour is inconvenient, and I do not think of gay marriage as being inconvenient. But are there inconvenient things I am willing to tolerate? This particular problem is an instance of the general problem I am wrestling with.

Series Index

*I want to emphasize again that I don't believe that the left-right continuum, or even the political compass, are sufficient. My hackles rise whenever I am placed on it, or asked to place myself on it. But I do know that political opinion tests most recently place me as a Leftist Libertarian (but not by very much). I kind of bridle under that label, but at least you'll know where I'm coming from if I tell you that.

Thursday, 31 January 2013

Do I Choose My Ethical Beliefs?


Good People and Going Wrong, Part 4

In the last post I said that values are largely arbitrary. Because it is my nature, I am now worried that any readers I have will be angry with me. After all, I just suggested that their very rational, well-reflected, and totally accurate values are not particularly likely to be correct or as deliberately chosen as they known those values to be. After all, I chose my values! No one else did.

I'm worried that you are angry with me because that is what I do; I care greatly that I do not cause offense, to start with, and anger is an indicator of offense. I also do not like it when people get angry with me because I want my social atmosphere to be pleasant, not heated. Further, I have the weakness of allowing other people's opinions of me to influence my own sense of self-worth (particularly when their opinion is negative). While I know that the last reason is a poor one, and while I am pretty good at giving my moral principles more votes than my anxieties (or, well, sometimes I think I'm good at that), I did not have much choice in whether I would care about other people's opinions. I do not know where that came from, but I sure didn't pick it.

Of course, I am working on not caring so much about that. Psychology, thankfully, is somewhat malleable. But the only reason I can even attempt to stop valuing everyone else's opinion of me is because I have other values that I consider to be more important. I'm not sure that I chose to think they are more important; all I know is that I think they are.

I am not arguing for absolute psychological determinism. (If you care, I agree with Locke that the entire argument about free will versus determinism is based on deep confusion about the terms "free" and "will"; free will attempts to say that the will has a will, while determinism attempts to say that the will has no will. The entire question is just really weird.) But you'll notice that I linked to Beck's blog last post (here), and I would say I generally agree with Beck that, speaking about human psychology, humans have weakly free wills. We can change some things about ourselves, but we are constrained by exactly the things we want to change.

What brought me to this place was not Experimental Theology, however, but the Myers-Briggs personality test. To be clear, I am aware that this test is not empirically valid and that no weight should be given to its predictive elements (since its predictions are no better than chance). I was looking at the test as a way of getting ideas about how I could write fictional characters whose headspaces looked very different from my own. But when taking the test myself I was somewhat shocked to find that INFJ and INFP (the types I seem equally poised between) both have ethical components that describe me precisely: in general, but specifically "aiming to better the lives of others" and "guided by their desire for harmony [...] unless their ethics are violated"). Meanwhile, other personality types are interested primarily in what is "right and correct, just, or fair" or "traditions and loyalty." As much as I know that the Myers-Briggs test is theoretically and empirically flawed (irredeemably so), I am beginning to wonder whether such values are more about personality than about philosophy. If so, looking at psychology rather than philosophy might be better for understanding my own moral code and assessing whether it needs change.

It also suggests that whether or not someone is a good person is not answerable in terms of values after all, but in terms of psychology. I realize I lean overmuch on Beck's blog as support for my own, but his post on "Orthodox Alexithymia" deals with how goodness has more to do with being in touch with one's emotions than it does with rational thought. Maybe this is true, but I find the thought scary--not so much because I feel out of touch with my own emotions but because it seems a hard psychological feature to change.

Series Index

Tuesday, 29 January 2013

What Kind of Character is a Virtue Ethicist?


Good People and Going Wrong, Part 3

One of the reasons I worry about this sort of thing is because I feel generally underequipped to persuade people that they are holding the wrong values. So far, what training I have in philosophy has done little to help me in this because philosophy rarely talks about values. It talks about philosophical systems.

I am used to framing ethical disagreements in terms of deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics, and moral nihilism, largely as a result of my philosophy classes. But a brief look at Wikipedia's page on morality indicates that there are a lot of other ways of measuring ethics. (Or, I should say, other ways of slicing up the moral thoughtscape.) Further, I've never been entirely sure why deontology is also matched against consequentialism as though they are opposites. Utilitarianism strikes me as a type of deontology, one with only two duties: maximize pleasure and minimize pain. (You can tweak any consequentialism to fit.) The point is that the terms "deontology," "consequentialism," and "virtue ethicist" do not tell me much. None of these terms tell me what values you have.

Let's say Alice is a deontologist. That means that Alice believes we have specific duties; the completion of these duties, regardless of their effects, is a moral good. This tells me that she will be strictly principled, and that insofar as she adheres to her own sense of morality she will obey those rules she takes to be true. But I do not know what duties she supposes are inherently good. Deontology itself does not determine these duties. She must have done further work to determine them. (Or cribbed them from somewhere else. But I still don't know where she cribbed them from.)

Let's say Bob is a consequentialist. This tells me that Bob will be interested not in the kinds of actions you take, but in the consequences you think your actions will have. He will not say things like, "Lying is wrong. Telling the truth is an ethical imperative." But he might say something like, "Don't lie to your girlfriend about this because it will just wind up hurting her." What I do not know is what kinds of consequences Bob cares about. Does he care about maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain in a system? Or does he also care about how equally that pleasure and pain are distributed throughout the system? And what kind of system is he concerned with: local, national, global; present day, within our lifetimes, all generations? The label "consequentialism" does not tell me what he values.

Let's say Carol is a virtue ethicist. This tells me that Carol is interested in being a good person. She wants her actions to help her develop her character such that she will be better at doing the right thing in the future. Carol treats ethical action as though it were a skill, something for which you train--sometimes by directly practicing the skill, sometimes by doing exercises that are adjacent to the skill, like learning dance to play better sport. When she decides an action, she asks herself, "What kind of person will this make me." But when she says she's a virtue ethicist, I do not know what kind of person she thinks it would be good to be. I do not know what skills she considers virtuous. I can imagine an Epicurean as a kind of a virtue ethicist: Epicureans were very interested in becoming skillful at maximizing pleasure and avoiding pain because they were aware that over-indulgence is destructive.

In other words, I've been talking in these posts about values rather than moral philosophies because they seem to make a bigger difference on a strictly interpersonal level than the conventional philosophy labels. (Of course, there are labels I have not mentioned: some that come to mind are Divine Command Theory, moral nihilism, and moral relativism--no, nihilism and relativism are not the same thing. But these seem to have many of the same weaknesses I already mentioned and are also reformulatable as versions of the others, just as the others are reformulatable as versions of these.) I've seen ethical arguements that come down to deontologically-flavoured Divine Command Theory versus consequentialism, but for the most part I get in arguments over values, not systems.

The trouble with arguing about values instead of systems, though, is that values are usually harder to argue for. If I value something, in many ways I just value it. (cf Richard Beck's The Theology ofCalvin and Hobbes, at his Experimental Theology.) How do I get someone else to value something like I do? Or how do I learn to value something like someone else--and how do I know when to try? Maybe there are ways of doing this, but I don't currently see them. So, ultimately, I worry about whether a person with what I feel to be misplaced values can still be a good person; if a person can only be excused if they have the right values, what sense is there in a world where values are largely arbitrary? (And, pressingly, what if my values are skewed?)

Series Index

Monday, 28 January 2013

Disguising Subversion with Love Stories

Romantic Subplot in The Hunger Games

Note: This is not part of my meta-ethics series. I just decided that I did not want to postpone publishing it until that series is done.

As I indicated before, I have recently seen The Hunger Games (movie, not book). One of the things that I found very surprising about this movie was just how subversive it is. Most supposedly subversive movies are either not very subversive at all (Avatar) or do a terrible, muddled job of subversion (V for Vendetta, oh my goodness). At least on the first viewing, The Hunger Games is much smarter than most of Hollywood's supposedly subversive movies, and it even takes a few potshots at conventional Hollywood storytelling--after all, it is about the use of media to suppress underprivileged populations. One of the most impressive instances was the movie's deliberate indication that the romantic subplot distracts from more important political questions.

(Here be spoilers.)

Combatants in the Hunger Games desperately need sponsors to help outfit them as the event proceeds, so the characters must be very deliberate about their public appearances. During the interviews before the Games themselves, Peeta says that he has a crush on Katniss. Katniss is angry that he would use her to further his own publicity, but their trainer Abernathy tells her that it has helped her publicity as well: it has made her desirable. Besides being a shout-out to Girard, this episode indicates that romantic feelings, whether or not they are genuine, are part of the proceedings. Instead of somehow transcending time and place, like we have pretended since Petrarch, love is subject to the society, culture, and ideology the lovers inhabit. Peeta's admission of love, even if it's true, is also an attempt at survival that is endorsed by the media spectacle and becomes part of the narrative that Flickerman, the interviewer and master of ceremonies, helps create. (Of course, he is probably working from a script, too.)

Abernathy latches onto this narrative device. What I find interesting is that another narrative device--Katniss' voluntary substitution of herself for her younger sister--is eclipsed by the romance narrative, at least as far as the publicity is concerned. I say publicity rather than public for a reason: Katniss' adoption of Rue as a surrogate sister certainly get the attention of Rue's district. What Abernathy knows--and likely what the Capital's propogandists rely on--is the fact that the romance narrative will provide explanations for potentially subversive behaviour, explanations that mitigate the subversiveness of it. So when Katniss and Peeta defy the authorities by attempting double-suicide rather than monomachy (and thereby trying to answer Peeta's question about dying in a way that shows the authorities that they do not own him), Abernathy is quick to use the romantic subplot to explain away this behaviour. He says that the pair "showed them up" and that there would be consequences: "This is serious. And not just for you. They don't take these things lightly." So Katniss and Peeta must act as though their behaviour was not about the power or authority, was not in fact directed at the Capital or about anything that might also concern the people of the poor Districts. In order to prevent the Capital from reinforcing that power with violence, they must act (cynically) like their actions are born of the sort of love that transcends time and place. Frankly, I was not sure whether to be impressed by this realization, or disappointed that Katniss decided to play along with the love narrative which disguised her more subversive motives. How much complicity should characters accept in order to survive long enough to fight that power?

One of the interesting things about seeing this as a movie but not reading the book is that I had no way of gauging the not-especially-expressive Katniss's emotions. I could not tell whether she actually reciprocated Peeta's attraction or romantic feelings. (I understand that in the book it is clear she does reciprocate somewhat, but that's second-hand). In this state of ignorance, the romantic subplot seemed even more surreal, even more a ploy to survive the Capital. Certainly her sacrifices for Peeta were not much different from her sacrifices for Rue, for whom she would feel no romantic love. How the other movies treat her relationship with Peeta is now of almost no consequence: the idea that romantic subplot distract from real political subversion in the Hunger Games, and also The Hunger Games, and also, by extension, if you're willing to think it, most popular culture, is already in place. I cannot be sure how strong this effect would be in first person narration.

I want to clarify a few things: I don't think that genuine, non-cynical romantic subplots (or main plots) are necessarily bad. But I would, for a lot of reasons, like to see much more fiction that treat such relationships with more sophistication and more awareness of the problems they can produce, and I would like to see more fiction that does not treat romantic subplots as particularly important. I think The Hunger Games does a good job of showing some of those problems.

I Prefer Honest Hypocrites to Deluded Saints

Good People and Going Wrong, Part 2

My previous post's discussion was incomplete, and I knew it while writing it. I hope to build out some of what I was missing here.

Part of the reason why I tended to prefer defining a good person by intent and earnest endeavour rather than actual action is not just to avoid saying that anyone who disagrees with me is a bad person. I also wanted to avoid the possibly unhelpful conclusion that no one is a good person. After all, I have never met a saint. No one lives up to their own ethical expectations all of the time. Speaking much more personally, I know I fail on even a minute-to-minute basis to live up to my ethical standards, particular when I'm using public transit and the bus is very busy. (I think very nasty things about strangers in such circumstances.) I am a hypocrite of the first order; what I do does not come close to meeting what I expect. But I hope to be an honest hypocrite: I know I do not practice what I preach, I admit it publicly, I try to close that gap, and I do not expect of others any more than what I do (or, actually, even what I do).

In fact, I would be highly suspicious of anyone who did live up to their own ethical standards. Unless I had it on good evidence that they were a saint, I would conclude that their ethical standards are far too low. Ethics are a challenge! They should be! Ethics require growth. Another possibility is that a person might really believe that they meet their own ethical standards, but in truth they do not. I think of the actor-observer asymmetry, where we attribute our own behaviour to the situation but we attribute other people's behaviour to their personalities. This is a very tempting kind of thing to do. In either case, such people make me nervous.

I can reason with an honest hypocrite. If an honest hypocrite has done something wrong, I can say, "Look, you did Action A. Action A violates Principle Y, which I know you hold." An honest hypocrit will fess up to it, apologize, and try to act differently in future. (Or an honest hypocrit might correct my interpretation of events if I was actually the one in error.) Someone who really believes that they are not a hypocrit, in either of the ways I outlined above, would not be so accomodating. They might not hold Principle Y at all, or they might believe that Action A did not violate Principle Y, even when it clearly does. It is much harder to interact with this kind of behaviour, though evidentally we often have to.

But if I take seriously what I said in my last post, that being incorrect about ethical beliefs does not mean you aren't a good person, is it even reasonable to make such a distinction between honest hypocrits and people who really do not believe that they don't have to be good people? Is believing that ethical imperatives are not actually imperatives the kind of incorrect belief that does not prevent one from being a good person? Can a hedonist be a good person?

Series Index

Saturday, 26 January 2013

Which Sense of "Right"?

Good People and Going Wrong, Part 1

The words right and wrong have two possible senses: they could be equivalent to correct and incorrect or they could be equivalent to moral and immoral. While these are conceptually distinct (the first set of senses pertain to claims while the second set of sense pertain to actions), the way we use these terms becomes confused. For instance, when you are hiring "the right person" for a particular position, what sense of right is meant? It seems that it tends to mean "correct," but it may not always be so. While this semantic confusion is not the subject of this post, I'm generally thinking about the way correctness and morality have been collapsed and I will try to un-collapse them.

(Do people know what I mean when I say "collapsed"? I am not sure if this is an academic/humanities term which has no currency outside of that field.)

I remembered getting into a disagreement with a friend over whether I ought to do a particular kind of action; I thought that it was an unethical kind of thing to do, but she thought that it was perfectly acceptable and probably even advisable. I'm sure I've had this kind of disagreement many times with many people, but what made this time memorable is that we rather quickly got at the heart of the disagreement: I believe that ethical action in that case was based on the altruistic attempt to prevent discomfort and other harm in those around me, while she believes that ethical action is primarily based on supporting fair action and acting fairly yourself. I value making others feel safe; she values equitable action. I was concerned that she thought that I thought that she was unethical, so I assured her that while I disagreed with what she thought was ethical practice, I recognized her as a good and principled person.

In other words, I was saying that I thought she was incorrect about what was ethical, but that, given her error, she was being ethical. (Or, if you like, she was wrong about what was right, but given her wrongness, she was right.) Presumably she would make the same claim about me.

Such a claim can destabilize morality, I quickly realized. How do you assess if someone is a good person?* Is that assessment based on ethical action--that is, the person's actions are typically in conformance with morality--or ethical intent--that is, the person honestly endeavours to adhere to morality? I ask because if such an assessment is based on action, then I would presumably only decide that those who adhered to my sense of morality are ethical people. If such an assessment is based on intent, then I would presumably decide that anyone who acted in accordance with their own sense of morality could be a good person; they may simply be a good person who does not-so-good things. My statement that I believed my friend was a good, ethically-oriented person, despite our disagreement about the best way to think of morality, seems to fit in the second claim.

The obvious trouble with this way of thinking about the goodness of a person is that, under such a rubric, someone like Hitler would be a good person. I do think some people would count as not-so-good people: there are probably quite a few folks who do not honestly attempt to do the right thing, either because they do not bother to define what the right thing is or because they have a strong sense of entitlement (that is, what they expect of other people differs drastically from what they expect of themselves). But there are selfless, well-intentioned monsters, and they count as good people as I seem to be defining it. So is there a way of tweaking this conception without either giving up the capacity to make such judgements or limiting goodness to only the way I understand it?

I have three provisional approaches to this problem:

1. A person might need to be within an acceptable degree of error. Some ethical approaches are more incorrect than others; if we say that radically incorrect kinds of ethics should be obvious in their flaws--that is, that only a person who did not do due diligence in thinking about ethics could subscribe to such a way of thinking of ethics--then we might be able to say that being too incorrect about ethics is itself unethical. Messing up the ratio between fairness and harmony/comfort is not so bad because both are goods and it just the ratio that is in error; advocating for racial purity is pretty bad because racial purity is not a good at all.

2. A person might need to have a particular set of ethical beliefs in order to be considered good; any other error is acceptable so long as this set of beliefs is intact. For instance, my friend and I both believe that compassion and altruism are important as bases for other ethical considerations. So is it possible to list a set of ethical beliefs that are non-negotiable? If so, I would put compassion and an incredible distaste for violence on that list, but I know that there are radical consequentialists who would not. (As Mycroft says to Sherlock, “Caring is not an advantage.")

3. It may be the case that I am reasoning from the interpersonal ethics of friends and small groups to the society-wide ethics of politics. Getting the balance between fairness and comfort honestly incorrect might be acceptable when we're talking about whether you should date two people at once (for example), but it might be absolutely unacceptable to make an error in the ratio of goods when we're talking about economic policy or immigration law.

Index Post

*I recognize that the legitimacy of making this kind of judgement is in question, and it needs to be. I will talk about this in a later post.
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