A Theory of Reading (1.0)
Introduction
Introduction
Although reading is an act most
people take for granted today—or, anyway, most people reading this will take it
for granted—what happens when we interpret the words written on a page and
attempt to produce intellectual content from that interpretation is far from
obvious. As a consequence, I have seen more than a few conversations about
books, and what a particular book means, go awry because the participants in
the conversation seemed to be talking past one another. Even if the
participants understood that they had different ideas about where meaning might
lie in a text, and how a person might go about recovering that meaning, they
did not seem to understand where they
disagreed—or at least one participant did not seem to understand what the other
party was getting at. I have been involved in such conversations myself, both
within academia and without.
This question is not clearly
resolved even within academia; I know firsthand that English literature
departments have not got it entirely figured out, and I understand that the
philosophers of language toiling away in philosophy departments have not
reached anything like consensus, either. (I had a professor who sat in on a
philosophy seminar, and she reported that they had a far different idea of what
we do in our discipline than, well, we have in our discipline.) However,
despite the lack of consensus on a theory
of interpretation, or what we call critical
theory, the discipline for the most part seems to manage: few practitioners
say to other practitioners that they are wrong because their whole approach to
the text-meaning problem is broken. So there is, I suspect, at least enough
common ground to be getting on with. And that common ground is worth
considering.
So here I am trying to do two
things at once, which might be a terrible mistake. The first of these is that I
want to outline my own theory of
reading, and the second of these is that I want to outline what you might
consider the bare minimum which literature departments assume. The reason I
suspect I can do both at once is that I got my own theory of reading from these
assumptions, so any elaboration of my own thinking will resemble in some way
the source of my thinking. However, whether or not this theory exactly
corresponds with the assumptions in the discipline of English literature, I
think this theory will be enough to be getting on with nonetheless: you should
be able to manage sufficiently in the discipline if you subscribe to these
ideas.
As a consequence of the above, anyone versed in literary/critical theory will find what I’ve written here both boring and naïve. The reason I am outlining all of this is not because I think it is ground-breaking or endlessly fascinating; rather, I simply want to lay my assumptions out explicitly so that other people will know where I’m coming from. The only other utility I can see here is to help people who don’t have any contact with literary/critical theory to understand the basic preconditions of that theory.
As a consequence of the above, anyone versed in literary/critical theory will find what I’ve written here both boring and naïve. The reason I am outlining all of this is not because I think it is ground-breaking or endlessly fascinating; rather, I simply want to lay my assumptions out explicitly so that other people will know where I’m coming from. The only other utility I can see here is to help people who don’t have any contact with literary/critical theory to understand the basic preconditions of that theory.
In Part I, I hope to construct
the bare-bones of my theory by attending to certain observations for which any
theory of reading must account. As far as I can tell, these observations are
non-negotiable; at the very least, to reject them is to reject the idea of
reading itself. The major crux of Part I is that I distinguish between
different versions of a text which a person might confuse for one another: for
instance, what the author wanted to write is not the same thing as what the
author actually wrote, and the reader’s experience of reading a text is not the
same thing as the text that the reader read. In Part II, I try to outline the
standards according to which a person might tell if an interpretation is a good
one or not: after all, if I say that interpretation is possible, and that some
interpretations are better than others, I must be able to account for what
would make one interpretation better than another. In other words, I summarize
what I would try to tell my students back when I was a TA—though, to be honest,
I wish I had thought to make so explicit a list back then. In Part III, I am
going to come back to the distinction between the reader’s experience of a text
and the text itself, because I want to make sure that I am very clear about why
both things are important, and what these means for criticizing an author or an
author’s works. Finally, in Part IV, I attempt the quickest and most
insufficient survey of critical theory I have ever seen (let alone written).
Despite its woeful brevity, I do want to make clear where I am getting the
ideas with which I am working; since I eschewed reference to these schools in
the first three parts, I think it would be both necessary and beneficial for me
to indicate my influences here. Please consider this as nothing more than a
casually annotated Works Cited page: if you want to know anything about
deconstruction or archetypal criticism, you’d be better off researching it more
extensively yourself instead of taking my summary as complete and without bias.
Index
Part I: Where is the Meaning of a Text?
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